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THE SOVIET VIEW ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
Leon S. Lipson
The background of Marxist-Leninist
theory with which Soviet international
law began permitted, and indeed required, an analysis of the contemporary
nation-state system from without. So
long as a Soviet analyst could in thought
remain outside the system, he found not
much difficulty with the conundrum
that has troubled so much of the writing
about international law since the fictions of medieval universality broke
down; that is, the problem to which you
addressed yourselves yesterday afternoon, of the efficacy and even the
existence of international law in the
absence of a single compelling enforcement machinery. That problem has
seemed especially acute to Western
seholars under the influence of what
they thought to be the implications of
Austinian positivism. It was taken care
of in early Soviet terms by a theory of
the organization of society which refused to look on states as the ultimate
aggregates of legitimatized power. Instead it emphasized the controlling role
of the bourgeoisie, a class that was
supposed to overlie all society, regardless of political boundaries, in those
parts of the world which had attained
industrial civilization. We must remember that one of the reasons for calling
upon the proletarians of the world to
unite was that it was assumed that for
many purposes the bourgeoisie of the
world were already united.

International law in a bourgeois
setting, so the theory ran, was sanctioned by the transverse power of the
global bourgeoisie up to the point where
imperialistic conflict, caused by the
growing contradictions of capitalist
society and capitalist economics, was
expected to lead to a breakdown of the
system and open the way for a proletarian revolution and the establishment of socialism. Under this analysis,
international law is trivial until the
moment it becomes obsolete.
Before and for some time after its
occurrence, the Russian revolution was
expected to touch off a continuing
series of revolutions in the more industrial countries of, at least, continental
Europe. As Taracouzio put it:
With ... the advent of a single
world-wide denationalized, classless society, there [would] be no
place for a system of law regulating the international life of
independent states. International
law [would] be converted into a
purely domestic inter-Soviet law,
a federal law for a world-wide
union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
It was no accident-to use a favorite
Soviet phrase that is typically redundant, for under the philosophy of
dialectical materialism it never is an
accident-that the name given to the
new federation at the time of its official
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formation at the end of 1922 contained
no geographically limiting term. "Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, " while the
word Soviet betrays its Russian origin, is
in principle capable of expansion without incongruity to embrace any territory on earth, or beyond.
Events in the first five years after the
1917 Revolution required a modification of these perspectives. The revolution did not spread to all of Europe,
though there were brief episodes in
Germany and Hungary. Conflicts on the
perimeter of the former Russian Empire
with national and anti-Bolshevist forces
along the Baltic coast, in Poland, and in
the Caucasus led to temporary independence for some and to inclusion
within the federation for others. Foreign intervention in Russia by some
fourteen states from 1917 to 1922,
aimed first mainly at supporting the
forces continuing the war against Germany, later at safeguarding lives and
property of foreigners and (in a confused and ineffectual way) assisting the
efforts of anti-Bolshevist armies, may
have helped to teach the Bolshevik
publicists gradually that national boundaries can be ignored in more than one
direction and that territorial integrity
has its uses.
The stabilization of the international
situation in the early twenties included
on the Soviet side a partial settlingdown to statehood. For strategic reasons it proved necessary to coexist
temporarily with other states that remained opposed to the Bolshevik revolution; for economic reasons it was
necessary for the young, ravaged, and
very poor Soviet state to establish commercial relations abroad. True, Lenin
and his successors have presented the
case as though the economic necessity
constrained not the Soviet Union but
the outside world; but that was a
common turn of Soviet, particularly
Leninist, argumentation that did not
affect the substance.
In this state of affairs, Soviet Russia

necessarily became a part of the international community that its leaders analyzed and assailed. Unable thenceforth
to denounce all existing rules and
processes of international law, the
Soviet writers appealed openly to expediency as the principle of selection.
As a Soviet writer remarked at the time:
The situation became rather
ambiguous. On the one hand,
Soviet Russia openly and loudly
declared its denunciation of all
treaties inherited from Tsarism
and the Government of Kerensky,
of all secret conventions, military
debts, privileges of exploitation
and imperialist obligations, and on
the other, its official representative often demanded the execution of minor agreements, referring to the fact that beneath the
text were affixed the seal and the
signature of the Imperial [Tsarist]
Ambassador.
As the strategic retreat of the New
Economic Policy in 1921-1928 required
some limited encouragement for foreign
technicians and supply contracts, it was
discovered that even the dictates of
expediency can lead in different directions for the short term and the long; in
the longer-term interest of the Soviet
Union it was thought to be expedient to
display-and here the etymology is intentionally convergent-the status and
stability of a state. Thus we saw the
development, in the mid-twenties, of
"The International Law of the Transitional Period," in which an attempt was
made to reconcile the millennial perspectives of pre-Revolutionary MarxistLeninist theory with the contemporary
coexistence of the Soviet Union and
surrounding, or encircling states. At this
time, the attitude of the Soviet Union
to the traditional norms of international
law was said by the conciliatory wing of
Soviet international jurists to be what
we might call consistently inconsistent,
in the sense that the Soviet Union took
what it liked and rejected what it did
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not like in conformity to its general
policies. Thus the Soviet Union was said
to "exclude" such notions as extraterritoriality, special concessionary privileges, and mandates; the Soviet Union
"selected," meaning chose to accept,
such institutions at consular and diplomatic immunities; the Soviet Union
"interpreted" other doctrines of international law as its interests dictated.
The differentiated attitude toward
traditional doctrines of international
law assured the conformity of doctrine
to current foreign policy. It also, however, presupposed an awkward concession on what in the martial Soviet
terminology was known as the theoretical front. Here you must, for a minute
or two, wander with me through the
thicket of Marxist dialectic. It had been
accepted teaching that social institutions, including law, must belong either
to the base or to the superstructure. The
base included preeminently the relationships of production. Between base and
superstructure was a causal connection,
operating preponderantly in one direction: the base determined the superstructure, though it was at times conceded that in some respects the superstructure might have a back-influence
on the base. But if anything was central
to the Soviet Marxist catechism, it was
that the base, in the Soviet Union,
differed fundamentally from the base in
the countries of capitalism. That served
as a convenient polemical framework in
the Soviet comparative analysis of internal legal systems; but it seemed to
imply that the same international law
could not exist for the Soviet Union as
for "bourgeois" countries. The dilemma
was that if international law belonged to
the superstructure, states with different
bases could not be acknowledged to
agree upon international rules so long as
it remained dogma that base determines
superstructure; but if one assigned international law to the base, then one
denied the primacy of productive relationships and called into question the

uniqueness of Soviet society which was
so important for the self-image and the
propaganda of the new leadership.
If this problem had arisen in the
early 1950's, when some of the foundations of Marxism-Leninism were being
revisited, it could have been swept
under by a stronger assertion of the
superstructure's partial independence of
the base. As it was, in the 1920's it was
necessary to resort to two other explanations. The first of these was the
compromise formula, which most Soviet
definitions of international law have
included since, to the effect that international law is the complex of norms
that regulate relations between states in
the process of their struggle and collaboration, or conflict and cooperation, and
so on. The second, which is a feature of
the Stalin period, rests on the distinction familiar to us and found in many
corners of Soviet thought between form
and content; just as a given internal
legal, economic, or social institution can
be bourgeois in form but Socialist in
content, so differing bases can infuse a
verbally identic form in international
law with different content. A similar
problem encountered later, after the
Second World War, in characterizing the
relations between countries in the
Soviet camp, was met by the distinction
between letter and spirit; the rules that
were obeyed only in the letter by
bourgeois countries were infused with a
different spirit when applied between
friendly socialist countries.
During the 1920's and 1930's the
Soviet Union carried on treaty relations,
entered into international supply contracts, conducted exchanges of goods,
took part in certain international organizations, and lived an international life,
though at a level of activity far below
that of the West. The more powedul
Hitler became, the more traditional
Soviet international law became.
After the Second World War, the
Soviet Union came to playa leading role
in world politics. The Soviet attitudes
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toward the structure of international
politics have undergone certain changes,
and the distribution of emphasis in
Soviet international law is correspondingly being modified. The process was
submerged for a while in the suppression of foreign contacts that accompanied the purges of the late nineteen
forties and early fifties, but there is
considerable evidence that it had begun
well before Stalin's death. The chief
factors in the process seem to have
included, beside the temporary power
vacuum in Europe and the emergence of
a loosely bipolar confrontation, the
increasing inability to tolerate high risks
of large-scale war after the development
of nuclear weapons, particularly after
the development of the hydrogen bomb;
the emergence of new nations from the
passing of the old colonialism in Africa
and Asia; and the coming to power in
neighboring countries of regimes called
socialist and prepared, on the whole, to
act in accord with Soviet moves in the
international arena
In Soviet foreign policy these factors
led to the peace campaigns, in new
form; the support for "national-liberation movements" even at the cost of
temporary eclipse for local communist
parties; the grant of a substantial
amount of foreign aid, deployed of
course for political effect, but often
useful, nevertheless; and the renewal of
the campaign for general and complete
disarmament. (By the way, for those of
you who might otherwise be inclined to
date the Soviet campaign for general
and complete disarmament from the
Khrnshchev period, it would be instructive to consider the judgment made by
George Grafton Wilson that:
One of the most striking
features of Soviet policy has been
advocacy of complete disarmament, land, maritime and aerial, in
contrast to the policy of most
states, which have favored varying
degrees of mere limitation of
armament.

The striking thing about that quotation
is that it was published twenty-eight
years ago.)
At present the Soviet Union is one of
the most active participants in international relations and a prominent actor in
the stages of international law. Though
the Soviet Union is absent from some
important international organizations, it
is present and active in many, and some
of these are closely concerned with
problems of international law. It has
sent judges to the International Court of
Justice; it takes part in the work of the
International Law Commission; its
representatives make legal arguments in
many bodies of the United Nations; it
sends delegations to nongovernmental
bodies like the International Law Association and the International Association of LegaL Sciences; its scholars produce yearbooks of international law,
textbooks on international law (one of
which was published in English translation not long ago), and numerous monographs and articles; it is party to scores
of bilateral and multilateral ~rrreements,
not all limited to the Soviet camp; its
agents conclude many foreign trade
agreements, providing for arbitration in
Moscow before a vigorous, and, we are
told, reasonably fair arbitration commission.
This activity is enough to provide
some evidence of the characteristics of
Soviet utterances in international law. I
should say the chief characteristics,
aside from the current emphasis upon
the principle of coexistence (to which I
shall return), are that contemporary
Soviet utterances in international law
are predominantly officia~ moralistic,
projective, offensive, and underdeveloped. These traits are not wholly absent
from Western work in international law,
but the differences of degree are great.
As someone has said, the difference
between a difference in kind and a
difference in degree is in itself only a
difference in degree.
By official I mean that Soviet work
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in international law supports current
Sovict foreign policy with unremitting
fidelity. Current Soviet foreign policy is
always defended as legal; even past
Soviet foreign policy is defended as legal
though the policies may have been
abandoned. Never is there a public
statement by a Soviet private jurist
calling into question the action of the
Soviet government To put it shortly,
every Soviet writer on international law
is on active duty. Variations do not
often exist, and when they do they tend
to be either on subjects of slight current
practical importance, or on the question
of which reason is to be preferred for
supporting the legality of given Soviet
behavior or the illegality of given be·
havior of an adversary. Thus every
utterance from a Soviet source on international law must be taken as "interested," that is, the source must be
considered. This fact need not always
tell against the intellectual quality of
what they write; in this country, lawyers' briefs often make impressive contributions to the thinking of the judges
to whom they are directed, but they are
recognized nonetheless as briefs.
Soviet argument on questions of international law is easy and cogent once
you grant the invariant major premise
tllat the Soviet Union is right. From this
premise, combined with the minor premise describing in tendentious terms
whatever the Soviet Government has
done or advocated in a particular case is
right
If this judgment seems harsh to you,
consider the following typical illustration. A respected Soviet international
jurist discusses the relations between
states within the Soviet orbit when
faced with internal law on the one hand
and international law on the other:
In the practice of the Soviet
Union and the People's Democr a cies, conflicts between the
norms of international law and
ilie norms of internal law are
impossible. The socialist states,

strictly observing international
law, cannot either impose or
accept any of its norms that
would contradict the principles of
internal law of the contracting
states. On the other hand, strictly
observing international agreements, they cannot utter any
norms of internal law that would
contradict their international obligations.
Again, on the right of asylum, a
statement is made that convinces only
one who is already committed to the
major premise:
The right of asylum is formally
acknowledged by all states as a
current principle of international
law. In the USSR and the countries of People's Democracy it is
available to progressives .... Asylum in socialist
countries is not afforded to diversionists, terrorists and others of
that ilk. In many capitalist countries, the representatives of leading and progressive mankind are in
fact deprived of asylum, which,
however, is widely afforded to all
sorts of diversionists, terrorists
and traitors who have committed
grave crimes against their homelands.
In final illustration of this official
characteristic I should like to correct
the statement made yesterday, referring
to violations of treaty by the Soviet
Government. This is contradicted by the
following information furnished by the
authoritative current Soviet textbook
on international law, which reports:
The Soviet Union, like the
other socialist countries, stands
for the strict observance of obligations assumed under international
agreements, as has been demonstrated by the entire history of
Soviet foreign relations.... The
Soviet Union's strict fulfillment of
its obligations under the U.N.
Charter and other international
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treaties clearly demonstrates the
Soviet Union's adherence to one
of the basic principles of international law-the principle pacta
sunt seroanda.
The imperialist states frequently refuse to fulfill their obligations, and make international
treaties mere scraps of paper. But
it must not be concluded from
this that international treaty links
are unstable. There are now strong
social and political forces opposing arbitrary action.
Perhaps at the time when yesterday's
speaker mentioned Soviet treaty violations he did not have present in his
mind the major premise that the Soviet
Union does not vjolate treaties.
Sovet international law is official,
then. It also is moralistic. In internationallaw, as in domestic law and some
other areas of culture, Soviet thinking
has undergone a transformation since
the days when the Revolution was
young. The very values and principles
and even rules that used to be derided as
bQurgeois are now not merely accepted
but expropriated. No longer is the
Soviet Union presented as the bearer of
a supermorality, transcending the hypocritical and outworn morality of the
bourgeois past; now it is the Soviet
Union that has inherited the obligations
that used to be borne by the bourgeoisie
in the days of its vigor. A Soviet scholar
mentions as one category of "generally
recognized principles of international
law":
principles and concepts that
entered into international law during the struggle of the bourgeoisie
with feudalism under the influence of the democratic and national-liberation movement. They
above all define basic rights and
duties of states in international
relations, and then guarantees of
the rights of the population and
various other sides of intern a-

tionallife. Such are the principles
of sovereignty and equal rights of
states, non-intervention ... inviolability of state territory, the
institutions of citizenship, plebiscite, rights of asylum for political
emigrants, etc. These democratic
principles and institutions, which
reflected in their time the demands of "the broad masses who
took part in bourgeois revolutions
an dna tional-liberation movements, were taken up and raised
to a new height hy the Soviet
Union and other socialist states.
The same moralistic tone can be observed in the Soviet espousal of disarmament, now about to be proclaimed not
merely a policy, but also an existing
principle of international law. Expediency is (officially) shuffled;
morality is trumpeted.
Official, moralistic, projective. I use
the term projective in the sense in which
psychologists use it when speaking of
the tendency to attribute to others the
ideas and intentions that one must deny
in one's self. For example, it is commo~
to meet in Soviet work condemnation
of the United States for concluding
agreements "involving unequal rights"
as with the Marshall Plan-which, as you
will remember, the Soviet Union kept
some Central European satellites from
joining when they wished to. For
another example, I heard a Soviet scholar in Moscow insist to some colle~rrues
planning a work on disarmament that
they must expose the Western practice,
which he said was to advocate disarmament not merely hypocritically and
without intending to disarm, but precisely in order to lull the Soviet Union
and other peace-loving states into a
dangerous reduction of their armed
strength. For a final example, when
Soviet publicists a couple of years ago
stepped up their campaign against published American discussion of orbiting
space weapons, it was fairly clear that
the Soviet Union was well on the way to
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a decision to develop those weapons.
Official, moralistic, projective, offensive. This term is used in the military
sense. Soviet work in international law
is predominantly polemical, and the
polemics are based on the theory that
the best defense is a good offense, like
the theories held by the French general
staff before the First World War or the
old management of the Boston Red
Sox. Thus the condemnation by the
United Nations of the use of Soviet
tanks and troops to suppress the Hungarian revolution in 1956 is referred to
by a Soviet seholar of international law
in this way:
The Soviet Union and other
socialist states spoke out decisively against the efforts of the
U.S.A. and its partners to make
use of the United Nations Organization as an instrument of intervention in the internal affairs of
the Hungarian People's Republic
after the counterrevolutionary
rebellion, inspired by foreign reaction, had been crushed in November 1956.
The same observation of offensiveness can be made of the continuing
Soviet emphasis upon outlawry of aggression, or the combination of high
military expenditures with high volume
of disarmament campaigning, or the
criticism of the American "voting
machine" in the United Nations to draw
fire away from the Soviet veto. You
may not all be familiar with the old
story of the visitor to Moscow who, on
being shown a new subway station,
admired the decoration but after a while
asked his host why there weren't any
trains, and was answered, "And what
about the lynching of negroes in your
Southern states?" (Correspondingly, it
is no answer to Soviet criticism of U.S.
racial discrimination to say that the
Soviets have a housing shortage or even
that they have racial discrimination.)
My last epithet was that present-day
Soviet international law was under-

developed. In one sense it is underdeveloped in that it seems designed to win
the support and the votes of the underdeveloped nations, or, as we are now
calling them in an effort to seem less
condescending, the new or newly developing nations. The analysis of international law, the choice of emphasis, the
thrust of the moralizing, is calculated to
appeal to ex-colonial countries and
other suffering from the present fact or
the recollection of Western domination.
The attitudes that seemed to suit the
Soviet Union in the days of its weakness
are found appropriately transferable to
those countries, and the gulf between
(say) Mali or Bolivia and the Soviet
Union of today is ignored. There are
still gains to be made by playing the role
of the underdog.
In another sense, Soviet international
law today is intellectually underdeveloped. When I looked in yesterday on
Professor Sohn's class I heard him say
that, if you look at Soviet work in
international law and deleted the obeisances to Lenin and the criticism of the
imperialists, what you would have left
would be something like our own work
in international law, only not as good.
He attributed this to restrictions on
access to Western literature and Western
jurists. He did not, as I understood
him-nor do I-make any reflections on
the personal abilities of Soviet jurists.
He might have added that in international law activity, as in many other
respects, Soviet society today has points
in common with the Western world of
two or three generations ago, not with
the Western world of today or (let us
hope) with the Western world of, say,
1984. The improvement in the quality
of the work of the newer generation of
Soviet jurists is welcome but still minor.
Soviet international law, far from being
the wave of the future, is intellectually a
stagnant pool left over from the past.
Professor Lissitzyn once put it more
kindly when he wrote of their technical
conservatism. Many rules are stated and
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restated without criticism or reflection.
Soviet doctrine on the sources of law
follows older practice, as you know, in
exalting treaties and depreciating custom. Soviet doctrine on the supposed
conflict between internal law and international law comes down-except for
relations between states in what is misleadingly called the socialist camp-on
the side of the primacy of internal law.
You heard yesterday of the rapid
growth of legal doctrine on the continental shelf from the time of President
Truman's proclamation in 1945 to the
Geneva Conference on the Law of the
Sea in 1958; but before that the Soviet
publicis.ts had poured scorn on the idea
that the rights of a coastal state to
resources on the continental shelf were
becoming recognized in international
law. As one of them said:
Thus a unilateral declaration
proclaiming the seizure of open
sea belonging to all and making it
one's own property is turned into
a norm of international law with
the naked use of the machinery of
the "legalization" of seizures, [the
Americans declare, the satellites
"follow," "scholarship" recognizes-and behold, a norm is
born!].
Technical conservatism does not
mean that the Soviet Union is satisfied
with the present state of generally
accepted international law. Usually they
cannot directly admit dissatisfaction
without denying to the norms with
which they disagree the dignity of being
called existing rules of international law;
and they can playas many games as we
can with the lex lata and the tex
ferenda, which may be rudely translated
as calling the rule that helps you the law
that is, and calling the rule that helps
the other man the law that he wishes
were the law. But they have other
devices too. To look at those devices in
perspective, let us return to their theme
of peaceful coexistence.
Peaceful Coexistence. In some

pronouncements of Soviet at..thorities,
the principle of peaceful coexistence has
been said to be not merely the basis of
the Soviet view of international law, but
the basis of all international law today,
and not merely the basis, but the key,
or the core, of all international law. It is
even said that international law today
has become the law of peaceful coexistence. So important a concept
deserves our attention.
At the outset we are not to confuse
"Peaceful Coexistence," in quotation
marks and with initial capitals, with
peaceful coexistence in the literal sense
of the term. For example, it is clear that
the term in Soviet usage does not mean
condemnation of all war. Wars that
serve the ends of Soviet foreign policy
are given the label of wars of national
liberation or revolutionary civil wars
and are accepted as just.
It is fairly clear also that the term in
Soviet usage does not connote relationships of trust, friendship, agreement, or
free communication between the
peoples of the "peacefully coexisting"
states. A striking confirmation of the
freedom of maneuver left to the Soviet
Union by the principle of peaceful
coexistence was noticed last year by
some close readers of the Soviet press.
On January 30, 1962, Suslov, the chief
Soviet Marxist theoretician (next to
Chairman Khrushchev), made a speech
at a conference of Soviet university
teachers in the social sciences. His
speech was published in Pravda on
February 4th. According to that report,
he said:
Peaceful coexistence means the
coexistence of states with different social systems. It means the
rejection of war, the settlement of
disputes between states through
negotiations. It means the refusal
to violate the territorial integrity
of states, the refusal to export
revolution and export counterrevolution. Finally, peaceful coexistence is economic rivalry of
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states, agreements, trading relations on the basis of mutual advantage between states.
Notice the refusal to export revolution
and export counterrevolution.
Thirteen days later the same speech
was published again in the chief theoretical magazine, Kommunist, here
Suslov was made to say:
Peaceful coexistence means
. . . the refusal to violate the territorial integrity of states, the inadmissibility of the export of
coun terrevolu tion ....
The reference to the refusal to export
revolution had now been deleted, apparently at the last minute from galley
proof or page proof; the key sentence in
Kommunist is very widely spaced to
make up for the deletion.
Peaceful coexistence in the sphere of
ideology has been repudiated by the
Soviet leadership in many statements,
directed principally at the Soviet population to make sure they do not get any
wrong idea. That the idea, though not
the precise words, of "peaceful coexistence" was used as a tactic in
foreign policy, was made clear in the
earlier and more candid days of the
Soviet regime when Lenin said, in a
letter to his representative at the Genoa
Conference of 1922:
•.. we, communists, have our
own communist program [Third
In ternational ] ; nevertheless we
consider it our duty as merchants
to support [even if there is only
1/10,000 chance] the pacifists in
the other, i.e., bourgeois
camp.... It will be both biting
and "amicable" and will help to
demoralize the enemy. With such
tactics we will win even if Genoa
fails.
As recently as early 1961, Chairman
Khrushchev referred to the policy of
peaceful coexistence as "a form of
intensive economic, political and
ideological struggle of the proletariat
against the aggressive forces of im-

perialism in the international arena."
The current Program of the Communist
Party uses similar language.
Thus the fact that the considerable
resources of scholarly and lay communication at the disposal of the Soviet
leaders are directed toward the celebration of the importance of "Peaceful
Coexistence" says nothing necessarily
about the probable foreign policy of the
Soviet Union .
The term, as such, has been found in
Soviet literature bearing as early a date
as 1920. Though contemporary Soviet
writing invariably describes the principle
of peaceful coexistence as Leninist, by
the way, the term does not seem to have
been used by Lenin. It was Chicherin,
People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs,
who referred to the Peace Treaty with
Estonia as the "first experiment in
peaceful coexistence with bourgeois
states." Twenty years later, as we know,
the state of Estonia ceased to exist and
it became unnecessary to coexist with
her, except in the sense that the robin,
in Don Marquis's old poem, coexisted
with the worm it had swallowed.
While peaceful coexistence was often
mentioned by Stalin, especially during
the period of the United Front in the
thirties and the period of wartime collaboration in the early forties, it is only
since 1956 that the slogan has become
central to Soviet pronouncements. At
that time it took off from the Panch
Sheela, the Five Principles, which had
been proclaimed in the Sino-Indian pact
of 1954 and expanded in the Bandung
Declaration of 1955. Later the major
share of the credit' was ascribed more
directly to Lenin. As a principle in
international law, it has been treated in
numerous Soviet monographs and articles since 1956 and pressed vigorously
by Soviet representatives at international meetings of governmental and
nongovernmental organizations.
To distinguish between the political
and the legal purposes of the Soviet
emphasis on "Peaceful Coexistence"
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implies a distinction between law and
policy that is not made by the Soviets,
except for external consumption; but
we can distinguish between general strategic purposes and technical doctrinal
purposes.
The strategic uses of "Peaceful Coexistence" vary with the audience. AfroAsian audiences in general are assured
that the Soviet Union sides with them in
their campaigns for the Panch Sheela
and, more basically, that the Soviet
Union as an important European power
takes seriously a form of words that the
Mro-Asians profess to take seriously.
With other non-Soviet audiences, except
for Communist Party members or
sympathizers, the aim is to influence
non-Soviet disarmament, to attract EastWest trade, and to enlist support for
various specific Soviet moves in foreign
affairs from time to time. With communist audiences, the declaration of adherence to the policy of peaceful coexistence is a taking of sides on one of
the main issues between the Chinese and
Soviet communist leadership, which
may be defined as the issue whether the
expansion of the communist system can
be rapidly achieved without actions that
increase the risk of worldwide nuclear
war. Recently, before ~ Soviet audience,
some Soviet international lawyers took
pains to distinguish
the concept of peaceful coexistence, as the fundamental principle
of international law which is also
the basis of the foreign policy of
peace-loving states [from] ... the
concept of coexistence [note the
absence of the adjective] of the
two systems as an indication of
the stage of history referred to by
V.I. Lenin, a stage which is inevitable by virtue of the fact that the
socialist revolution does not triumph simultaneously in all countries.
The fact that all these various audiences
eavesdrop on one another has complicated the task of Soviet propagandists,

but they are assisted by the durable
propensity of us all to hear what wc
wish to hear and close our ears to what
we would rather not hear.
For some of these purposes, the
content of the principle has to be
spelled out, though not in great detail.
A minimum statement would include
the Panch Sheela: these five points refer
to respect for sovereignty, nonaggression, nonintervention in the internal
affairs of other states, respect for
equality of states, and peaceful coexistence itself, which in Afro-Asian usage is
one of the five points, but in Soviet
usage embraces all the others. Under
pressure from international diplomatic
and legal questioning, some additional
content, still at a high level of abstraction, has been given to the principle of
peaceful coexistence; it has been said to
include, for example, in Dr. Lapenna's
convenient summary:
1. Coexistence is "a fundamental principle of international
law. "
2. Peace without threat or use
of force; settling disputes by
peaceful means; individual or collective measures, in accordance
with the United Nations Charter,
to prevent or suppress acts of
aggression; prevention or suppression of war propaganda; promotion of the implementation of
general and complete disarmament.
3. Cooperation in the field of
economy, social and political
questions, science and culture.
4. Sovereignty and territorial
integrity; the right of peoples and
nations to self-determination;
anticolonialism.
5. Noninterference in the mternal affairs of other states.
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6. Equality of states; representation of states in international
organizations in conformity with
the interest of the three groups of
states. This is a promoting of the
Troika idea to the rank of a
principle of coexistence.
7. Fulfillment in good faith of
international obligations arising
from treaties and other sources of
international law.
On the whole, it is fair to say that
the Soviet publicists have not shown
themselves jealous for the purity of
their principle; they have seemed willing
provisionally to accept many of the
formulations offered by others as components of the principle. The reason for
this hospitality is, I think, the same as
the reason for the failure hitherto to
specify what Professor McWhinney calls
concrete secondary principles, that is,
principles sufficiently meaningful to be
arguable. To make clear what I believe
this reason to be, we should back up far
enough to look at the position of the
Soviet Union in the international legal
community and at some of the other
techniques advanced by the Soviet
Union in the past to improve that
position.
The Soviet Union began under conditions that implicitly denied the validity
of traditional international law as the
regulating idea of the traditional system
of nation-states. Upon coming into the
international community the Soviet
Union was very much in a minority.
Even today, though it is stronger, and
has several satellites and many friends in
power and out of power throughout the
world, the Soviet Union.both feels itself
to be in a minority still and finds it
useful for certain purposes of morals
and ideology to emphasize, at times,
that it is beleaguered by a hostile
majority. To the extent that the international community was a going concern,
Soviet views were alien and Soviet
policies were distrusted. Not only were

the doctrines of international law in
many respects disagreeable or hampering from the Soviet point of view, but
the processes by which international
legal doctrine was made and applied
seemed, under Soviet analysis, to be
necessarily exclusive and anti-Soviet.
The facts indeed lent some support to
this opinion.
In such a situation, Soviet international law theory, whatever its twists in
accompaniment to the course of Soviet
foreign relations, made use of a variety
of techniques to depreciate the existing
process of international norm-formation
and to enlarge the role to be reserved
for the Soviet Union in those processes.
There was the time when international
law was generally repudiated, later to be
accepted during a period of transition
admitted to be necessary before international law could be discarded along with
the system of independent nation-states.
There was the assertion that a state
whose polity was based upon a new and
juster social theory had the right and
duty to repudiate those particular doctrines of international law that offended
that theory. There was the continued
insistence upon the primacy of treaties
as sources of international law, the
belittling of the rule of custom, the
stress upon the necessity of the consent
of a state before that state could be
bound by a rule. When the United
Nations Charter was adopted, with its
institutional arrangements allowing a
very important role to the Soviet Union,
and its text corresponding in many ways
to the demands upon which Soviet
representatives had insisted. Soviet publicists began to exalt what was called the
international law of the Charter over
what was called traditional international
law. For some time it looked as though
primary stress was to be laid by Soviet
international law theorists upon the
institution known throughout the world
as "generally recognized principles of
law," or "the general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations. "
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While I have listed these techniques
roughly in the chronological order of
their appearance, it should be kept in
mind that there was no neat sequence of
use, abandonment, replacement. Many
of them are alive today, though not
flourishing. They all have been overshadowed, even if not quite superseded,
by the emphasis upon the principle of
peaceful coexistence. What counts, for
this purpose, is not that the principle
shall mean anything special rather than
anything else, or indeed that it shall
mean anything at all. What counts is
that something under the name of "the
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence"
should win recognition-without definition, preferably-as lying at the heart of
international law; that it should be
acknowledged the world over that to
define "the Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" is the most urgent task of
contemporary international law; that it
should be acknowledged that the
process of defining them requires the
participation and consent of the Soviet
Union; and by implication, that any
principle or doctrine of international
law that has not been accepted by the
Soviet Union as part of, or consistent
with, "the Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" has to be rejected as being
for that reason invalid.
There, in my opinion, we have the
chief significance of "the Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence" in contemporary
Soviet work on international law. There,
too, we have the explanation for the
hospitality of the Soviet publicists
toward so many of the items furnished
on provisional lists of principles of
peaceful coexistence by Yugoslavia,
Americans, Canadians, and others. They
are hospitable because at the present
stage of their campaign the content of
"Peaceful Coexistence" does not matter
for their main purpose. There will be
arguments about the content, but those
can expediently be postponed until a
later stage when the centrality of the
(undefined) "Principles" has been

conceded by the rest of the world. To
this end, many particular questions of
content can be sacrificed for the time
being if the sacrifice will purchase agreement to the procedural claim, to the
essential idea that their notion of peaceful coexistence is central to international law. At the Brussels meeting of
the International Law Association a
year ago, for instance, the Soviet delegation, led by the most eminent currently
authoritative Soviet international lawyer, were willing to admit a good many
topics to the list of issues discussable
under the heading of "Principles of
Peaceful Coexistence;" but when an
attempt was made to change the name
of the pertinent committee to drop the
slogan of peaceful coexistence and bring
the title into line with that used in the
United Nations, the Soviet delegation
quit work in the committee until the
change of name was blocked. Their
attachment to the name was not an
attachment to the fact described by the
name, or to the content they had been
suggesting for the name, but a recognition of the utility of the slogan in
serving other goals than this one and of
the energy that, having been invested in
its dissemination in international law
circles, would be wasted in part if it had
to be transferred to a new set of words.
In drawing this picture of the international law uses of the Soviet emphasis
upon "Peaceful Coexistence," I may
have overrationalized the mental
processes of Soviet lawyers, who may
well not have planned it all at once. And
I have no intention of asserting that the
engine they have tried to build will roll
along the planned route, or even that
the route cannot change. The Yugoslavs
and the Communist Chinese know how
wide the swings can be.
Such are the main features of Soviet
work in international law as they seem
to strike the observer today. Have we
any warrant for expecting them to alter
soon? In some directions we may be
justified in supposing the changes in the
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global situation of the Soviet regime to
do their work in affecting Soviet international law. For example, the strong
emphasis placed by Soviet doctrine on
territorial sovereignty may be affeeted
by several contemporary developments:
First, the Soviet Union is acquiring
power, influence, and attendant responsibilities in areas not contiguous to the
Soviet Union, and the map on which
they, the Soviet leaders, plan their
political moves, looks a little more like a
globe than it did in Stalin's time.
Second, trade and aid, while still minute
by our standards, are beginning to play
a more significant role than before in
Soviet cconomy and in Soviet foreign
policy. Third, the Soviet Union is becoming more active in impinging upon
other states in ways that are within the
purview of international law, not least
in their deployment of naval and ostensibly civilian vessels. (When Admiral
Mott, by the way, spoke of the reciprocal interest in innocent passage, I was
reminded of an old Russian proverb
with a liquid setting and perhaps a naval
application: "Don't spit in the well: you
may want to drink from it later.')
These factors are opposed, and perhaps still for a time will be outweighed,
by the weight of history and training,
the continued situation of the Soviet
Union as a huge land power potentially
threatened by action by sea and air, the
continuing political advantage to be
derived among nations of the Southern
Hemisphere by espousing extreme concepts of sovereignty, the Soviet Union's
perception of its minority status in most
international fora, and the continued
interest of the Soviet regime in restricting the access of its population to
outside influence and the access of
outside influences to its population.
We should not therefore be surprised
to see inconsistencies, hitches, conflicts
of emphasis. Proclamations closing large
areas of ocean to foreign fisheries, or
enclosing large bays, and advocacy of a
wide margin to the territorial sea, may

peacefully coexist with considerable sophistication in the use of Soviet fishing
trawlers for not necessarily innocent
passage; attacks upon the legality of
United States reconnaissance satellites
may be made in the same breath, or
speech, with assertions of the right of the
Soviet Union to make military use of
space. Efforts to achieve a special theoretical position for legal relations among
the states of the Soviet camp will be
combined with bitter resistance to regional groupings over which they have
no control; they are still uneasy with a
horizontal system, no matter whether
the several units of that system are
single states or groups of states. The
mixture will be spiced with that selfrighteousness in which the Soviet authorities have had so much experience
and defended by the enforced unanimity of the legal profession-unfortunately they don't have a Quincy Wright
of their own-but it will bear some
resemblance to the complex and manyshaded relationship that other great
powers have toward international law.
This is not, except by indirection, a
class on American work in international
law, and I shall not proffer detailed
comment or advice upon the course we
might take in reaction to, or consideration of, or disregard of, the Soviet work.
My attitude toward desirable American
policy is perhaps best expressed obliquely by a reference to the best
defense ever given, as it seems to me, for
Chairman Khrushchev's famous boast,
"We will bury you." As you know, he
has had many times to insist that the
statement was meant only figuratively,
that it was not meant to refer to
particular individuals, that it was compatible with peaceful coexistence, that
it has been misunderstood. But the best
answer on Khrushchev's behalf was
made for him more than twenty years
before Khrushchev's statement. In
1936, at the tercentenary of the founding of Harvard College, President
Conant moved that the meeting be
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adjourned to the same day of the year
2036. Ex-President Abbott Lawrence
Lowell intervened with a comment beginning with the words with which I
should like to close:
Before putting that motion [of
adjournment] I want to say a

word in its favor. If I read history
aright human institutions have
rarely been killed while they retain vitality. They commit suicide
or die from lack of vigor, and then
the adversary comes and buries
them•...
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